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FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE - DISCOVERY OF AMOUNT
OF LIABILITY INSURANCE COVERAGE - RULE 33
INTERROGATORIES TO PARTIES
Vollmer v. Szabo, 17 Ohio Misc. 143 (N.D. Ohio 1969).
The divergence in the federal courts over the discoverability of
insurance limits has been acute.' While many district courts have
held that the scope of discovery includes liability limits, at least an
equal number have held that it does not.2  The recently proposed
discovery amendment compelling disclosure of insurance coveragea
represents an effort to resolve these conflicting interpretations of
rule 26 (b) .4 The potential impact of the proposed rule may be seen
in the recent decision of Vollmer v. Szabo.' In this case the defend-
ant refused to comply with the plaintiff's request that he answer
interrogatories under rule 336 relating to the existence and amount
of his liability insurance. Thereupon, the plaintiff moved to compel
the defendant to answer. The court granted the plaintiff's motion.
In denying the defendant's subsequent motion for rehearing, the
court held that rule 26(b) is broad enough to permit disclosure of
1 Compare, e.g., Johanek v. Aberle, 27 F.R.D. 272 (D. Mont. 1961) (insurance
policy limits discoverable), with McClure v. Boeger, 105 F. Supp. 612 (E.D. Pa. 1952)
(insurance policy limits not discoverable). See also 2A W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF,
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 647.1 nn.45.5, 45.6 (Wright ed. 1961); 4 J.
MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 5 26.16131, at 1188-92 (2d ed. 1966); Fournier, Pre-Trial
Discovery of Insurance Coverage and Limits, 28 FORD. L. REV. 215 (1959); Frank,
Discovery and Insurance Coverage, 1959 INS. I.J. 281; Jenkins, Discovery of Auto-
mobile Liability Insurance Limits: Quillets of the Law, 14 KAN. L. REV. 59 (1965);
Williams, Discovery of Dollar Limits in Liability Policies in Automobile Tort Cases,
10 ALA. L. REV. 355 (1958); Comment, Discovery of Insurance Coverage: Hazy
Frontier of Insurance, 35 TENN. L. REV. 35 (1967).
2Id.
3 PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE, 43 F.R.D. 211, 225 (1968) [hereinafter cited as PROPOSED AMEND-
MENT).
A party may obtain discovery of the existence and contents of any insurance
agreement under which any person carrying on an insurance business may be
liable to satisfy part or all of a judgment which may be entered in the action or
to indemnify or reimburse for payments made to satisfy the judgment .... Id.
4 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b).
5 17 Ohio Misc. 143 (N.D. Ohio 1968).
6 FED. R. Civ. P. 33, which provides that "[a)ny party may serve upon any adverse
party written interrogatories to be answered by the party served .... Interrogatories
may relate to any matters which can be inquired into under Rule 26(b) ......
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liability insurance for purposes of rule 33 even where its only rele-
vance was to settlement negotiations.7
Under the traditional view automobile policy limits have not been
discoverable on the theory that such information was neither admis-
sible in evidence nor likely to lead to admissible evidence.' The
foundation of -this conclusion is an adherence to a literal interpreta-
tion of rule 26(b), which provides that a deponent may be examined
regarding any matter "which is relevant to the subject matter involved
in the pending action."9  Implicit in this reasoning is a reluctance by
the courts to expand the meaning of "subject matter" beyond issues
to be litigated at trial.'0 Since, with few exceptions," the amount of
liability insurance is inadmissible in evidence,' 2 it follows that a
literal interpretation of "subject matter" forecloses discovery of in-
surance coverage. 13 On the other hand, an increasing number of
federal cases have permitted discovery,' 4 reasoning that rule 26(b)
should be read liberally in light of the broad purpose of modern
discovery which is directed toward enhancing settlement prospects
by informing the parties of the realistic value of their claims before
trial.' 5
7 Vollmer v. Szabo, 17 Ohio Misc. 143, 145 (N.D. Ohio 1968). Note that Vollmer
must be qualified to the extent that its discussion was limited to the scope of discovery
language of rule 26(b) as it related to discoverable items under rule 33. Vollmer did
not purport to hold that its interpretation would be controlling for other discovery de-
vices. For example, although rule 26(b) determines the scope of discovery for purposes
of rule 34, discovery of things within the possession of a party, the latter rule still re-
quires a showing of good cause before the item is discoverable.
8 E.g., Hillman v. Penny, 29 F.R.D. 159 (E.D. Tenn. 1962); Gallimore v. Dye, 21
F.R.D. 283 (E.D. IlM. 1958). See generally J. MOORE, supra note 1, at 1191.
9 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b).
10 In Hooker v. Raytheon Co., 31 F.R.D. 120 (S.D. Cal. 1962), the court held that
rule 26(b) did not permit disclosure of insurance policy limits even though an issue in
the case could be resolved by reference to the defendant's insurance policy. To hold
otherwise, the court reasoned, would constitute a judicial amendment of rule 26(b).
11 For exceptions to the rule that an insurance policy is inadmissible into evidence,
see C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 168, at 355-57 (1954).
12Id. at 355.
13 E.g., Gallimore v. Dye, 21 F.R.D. 283, 285 (E.D. Ill. 1958), where it was stated
that when the "subject matter" is the daim of negligence, insurance coverage would not
be relevant to show negligence, nor would it be reasonably calculated to lead to the dis-
covery of admissible evidence showing negligence. See generally Thode, Some Re-
flections on the 1957 Amendments to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure Pertaining to
Witnesses at Trial, Depositions, and Discovery, 37 TEx. L. REV. 33, 40-41 (1958).
14 See Cook v. Welty, 253 F. Supp. 875 (D.D.C. 1966); Ash v. Farwell, 37 F.RD.
553 (D. Kan. 1965); Johanek v. Aberle, 27 F.R.D. 272 (D. Mont. 1961); Brackett v.
Woodall Food Prods., Inc., 12 F.R.D. 4 (E.D. Tenn. 1951).
15 Compare Roembke v. Wisdom, 22 F.R.D. 197, 199 (S.D. IMI. 1958), with People
ex rel. Terry v. Fisher, 12 Ill. 2d 231, 236, 145 N.E.2d 588, 592 (1957). In Roembke
the court accepted the view that the sole purpose of discovery is to detect evidence or
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Ohio federal courts have little decisional law with respect to the
discoverability of liability insurance limits. The only federal deci-
sion prior to Vollmer, McDaniel v. Mayle,'6 held that the language
of rule 26(b) precluded pretrial inquiry into insurance coverage.
Nevertheless, McDaniel implied that another court, adhering to a
broader interpretation, could reach the contrary result without abus-
ing its discretion."
The Vollmer court, while recognizing the sharp conflict in the
existing law, was persuaded by the argument that the present word-
ing of rule 26(b) is broad enough to permit discovery of policy limits
pursuant 'to rule 33.18 The court pointed out that the relevance of
liability insurance to the subject matter was not to be found in its
dubious relation to litigable issues of negligence or damages. Rather,
it indicated that insurance coverage is relevant to the subject matter
in the sense that such information bears greatly upon the conduct of
pretrial settlement negotiations."9  In sustaining the relation of in-
surance 'to the conduct of such negotiations, the court observed that
the defendant's insurance company is normally the real party in in-
terest, in that the company directs the defense as well as makes the
decision to disclose policy limits; 20 and that the nondisclosure of this
information represented an unwarranted tactical advantage for the
information leading to admissible evidence. In construing a state discovery rule pat-
terned after federal rule 26(b), the Terry court reasoned that discovery rules were
adopted to effectuate prompt disposition of litigation by fully educating parties in ad-
vance of trial as to the real value of their claims.
16 30 F.R.D. 399 (N.D. Ohio 1962).
17 The court stated that, in view of the conflict in the federal courts, the result in a
given case was merely "a matter of determining that school of thought which one con-
siders to represent the proper interpretation of [rule 26(b))." Id. at 400.
18 17 Ohio Misc. at 144.
19 Id. at 145. It should be noted that the court also alluded to arguments that (a)
discovery of insurance is not an area of special privacy, and (b) discovery would not
lead to open inquiry into a defendant's other assets. Id. Apparently, the court men-
tioned these points to discredit prior cases which had adopted these contentions. Some
cases had reasoned, in terrorem, that discovery of a defendant's insurance coverage
would lay bare all of his other assets. See, e.g., Hillman v. Penny, 29 F.R.D. 159 (E.D.
Tenn. 1962); McClure v. Boeger, 105 F. Supp. 612 (E.D. Pa. 1952). But see Johanek
v. Aberle, 27 F.R.D. 272 (D. Mont 1961). As to the former point, in Gallimore v.
Dye, 21 F.R.D. 283, 285 (E.D. Ill. 1958), it was stated that discovery of a defendant's
insurance presented a tempting invasion of the right of privacy. This theory has never
gained popularity, and has been severely criticized. See Jenkins, supra note 1, at 78.
20 It should be noted that the meaning of "real party in interest" is not to be con-
fused with its technical meaning in FED. R. Civ. P. 17(e). The Vollmer court appar-
ently intended to use the term in the sense that the insurer, though not joined as a party,
has a financial stake in the defendant's judgment and, thus, is active in the conduct of
the defendant's cause. See Williams, supra note 1, at 358; Comment, supra note 1, at
46 n.61.
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defense.21 Thus, the court concluded that compulsory disclosure
would avoid the element of surprise and enhance the prospects of a
speedy and just determination of the controversy through settle-
ment.22
In reaching its conclusion the court did not enumerate -the fact
patterns under which insurance coverage would be deemed relevant
to the subject matter of the pending action. Vollmer seems to sug-
gest that disclosure may be compelled in situations where a realistic
appraisal of the plaintiff's case based upon knowledge of the amount
of insurance would advance the probability of settlement.23 But,
critics have emphasized situations where discovery would realisti-
cally protract negotiations. 4 For example, assume that A brings an
action against B and B's insurer, X, for $30,000 damages arising out
of an automobile accident in which B's liability is questionable. As-
suming, further, that B is solvent and that A has an even chance of
recovery, there is a theoretical settlement value of $15,000. If A
discovers that B is insured for $25,000, it is arguable that A would
be unwilling to settle for the theoretical settlement figure, $15,000.
Conversely, X is not likely to entertain a settlement offer from A
much ,higher than the settlement value to the company. Thus, the
opponents of discovery contend that a greedy plaintiff could thwart
the opportunity for settlement if he knew the extent of the defend-
ant's liability limit.25 But, criticism on this ground is not appropri-
ate in every case because, in addition to the amount of insurance
coverage, several other elements effect the conduct of settlement
talks.2 6  Furthermore, by court rule, a safeguard could be employed
in situations where disclosure of policy limits could foreseeably lead
to protracted negotiations. For instance, in camera inspection by
the district judge as a condition precedent to permitting discovery of
2 1 See text accompanying note 30 infra.
2 17 Ohio Misc, at 145.
23 Id. On this point, the court did not elaborate. But generally, if the plaintiff's
damages are set higher than the policy limits, the case would usually be settled within
the policy limits if known to the plaintiff. See Jenkins, supra note 1, at 78-79.
2 4 E.g., Bisserier v. Manning, 207 F. Supp. 476 (D.N.J. 1962); Rosenberger v.
Vallejo, 30 F.R.D. 352 (W.D. Pa. 1962). See also Carman v. Fishel, 418 P.2d 963
(Okla. 1966); State ex rel. Bush v. Elliott, 363 S.W.2d 631 (Mo. 1963).
2 5 See 34 TEx. L. REv. 129, 131. See generally Keeton, Liability Insurance and
Responsibility for Settlement, 67 HARV. L. REv. 1136 (1954).
26 Other significant factors are: (1) the question of liability; (2) the nature of the
plaintiff's injuries; (3) the type of plaintiff and defendant (e.g., corporate defendants
are often considered "targets" of high jury verdicts); (4) the trial judge; (5) a congested
trial docket, where delay might be advantageous for either party. See Groce, Personal
Injury Cases: Reaching Reasonable Settlements Before Trial and Minimizing Recovery
at Trial, 20 ARm L. REV. 18, 19 (1966).
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the dollar limits of a policy is one device available to facilitate settle-
ment
7
Notwithstanding the absence of articulated guidelines as to the
proper circumstances for allowing discovery,18 the Vollmer rule
should generate practical ramifications effecting the conduct of per-
sonal injury litigation. Knowledge of -the amount of a defendant's
insurance fund will equalize the plaintiff's bargaining position by
facilitating a realistic appraisal of the value of the plaintiff's claim
for settlement purposes.2 Conversely, ,the defense will no longer
have its tactical advantage of withholding 'the policy limits until the
most strategic moment in the negotiations.30 The upshot of tactical
parity should result in more frequent and, in many instances, higher
settlement agreements.31
From the standpoint of the federal courts, Vollmer, in departing
from the result in McDaniel v. Mayle,3 2 has clearly expanded the
scope of discovery with respect ,to written interrogatories in Ohio.
Moreover, by attaching a broader meaning to subject matter than
earlier courts were willing to do, Vollmer has impliedly recognized
that settlement is a part of the judicial process and should be guided
by court rules. 3 Nevertheless, the extent of change wrought by this
27 See Comment, supra note 1, at 73; Cf. Hooker v. Raytheon Co., 31 F.R.D. 120
(S.D. Cal. 1962), where the court, though refusing discovery of policy limits, allowed
inquiry into the existence of a policy. The court proposed that, if a policy were dis-
closed, the court would inspect the policy in camera to determine if it contained any
provision relevant to a litigable issue.
28The absence of any dicta regarding the proper circumstances for permitting dis-
covery is surprising. It should be noted that the court quoted with approval the com-
ments of the Advisory Committee which expressly recognized that discovery of insurance
under the Proposed Amendment could hamper, as well as aid, settlement negotiations.
Vollmer v. Szabo, 17 Ohio Misc. 143, 144 (N.D. Ohio 1968), citing PROPOSED
AMENDMENT, Advisory Committee's Note, 43 F.R.D. 211, 229, (1968).
29 E.g., Landkammer v. O'Laughlin, 45 F.R.D. 240 (S.D. Iowa 1968); Slomberg v.
Pennabaker, 42 F.R.D. 10 (M.D. Pa. 1967). Contra Cooper v. Stender, 30 F.R.D. 389
(E.D. Tenn. 1962). See generally J. MOORE, snpra note 1, at 1190-91; Fournier, supra
note 1, at 228.
3 0 See Jenkins, supra note 1, at 79.
31 See Note, Proposed 1967 Amendments to Federal Discovery Rules, 68 COLUM.
L. REv. 271, 274 (1968).
3 2 See text accompanying notes 16-17 supra.
33 It is important to distinguish Vollmer from prior decisions reasoning that the
defendant's policy is relevant to litigable issues because of the existence of a state finan-
cial responsibility enactment. These cases argued that the presence of a comprehensive
legislative scheme relating to insurance afforded the plaintiff a discoverable interest in
the defendant's policy. See Slomberg v. Pennabaker, 42 F.R.D. 8 (M.D. Pa. 1967);
Johanek v. Aberle, 27 F.R.D. 272 (D. Mont. 1961) (alternate holding); Brackett v.
Woodall Food Prods., Inc., 12 F.R.D. 4 (E.D. Tenn. 1951). In essence, the distinction
is that the prior decisions looked to the pervasive presence of insurance in the case in
general, whereas Vollmer emphasized the pervasive presence of the insurance company
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decision is unclear. For example, a narrow reading would seem to
exclude from the purview of discovery the entire contents of the de-
fendant's policy, except for 'the dollar limit;34 and discovery might be
denied with respect to other important types of insurance such as pro-
fessional.malpractice and property damage insurancef 5 Further, the
court's emphasis upon the active role of the insurer in the defense
might be utilized to argue that discovery will be denied where the
insurance company disclaims liability under the defendant's policy.8 6
Finally, if the court's approval of the proposed amendment is indica-
tive of the court's intention not to limit its decision to the facts,
Vollmer may purport to establish a broader range of discovery than
earlier cases reaching the same result with respect to insurance cover-
age.
3 7
It seems that the relevance of liability to tort litigation, especially
automobile tort litigation, is beyond cavil.3 Ironically, many of the
cases denying discovery expressly recognized the importance of such
information to the plaintiff.3 " But, caught in the strictures of con-
in the case. In holding that a plaintiff had a discoverable interest derived from insur-
ance legislation, the earlier cases lost sight of the language of rule 26(b) which alone
governs the scope of federal discovery. On the other hand, Vollmer reasoned directly
from the language of rule 26(b), theorizing that insurance is relevant to pretrial settle-
ment, which the court deemed to be as much a part of the subject matter of a pending
suit as are litigable issues.
34 The proposed amendment of rule 26(b) would permit discovery into the "con-
tents" of a defendant's policy, which would presumably include more than the policy
limits. PROPOSED AMENDMENT, 43 F.R.D. 211, 225 (1968).
35 But see 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, TORTS § 13.6, at 777-82 (1956). Addition-
ally, since neither Vollmer nor the proposed amendment of the present rule 26(b)
allude to automobile financial responsibility enactments, it is arguable that the Vollmer
rationale would permit discovery in cases which do not involve an automobile tort.
36 Although modern insurance law provides that an injured party's chances of re-
covery are no longer in danger of being thwarted by the insured's insolvency, a victim's
right to collect from the insurance company is still conditioned upon the insured de-
fendant's performance of policy terms. Id. at 778-81. Therefore, discovery of terms
and conditions, in addition to policy limits, may be of great importance to the plaintiff.
3 7 See note 35 supra.
38 In Clauss v. Danker, 264 F. Supp. 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), the court observed the
importance of disclosure to judicial administration:
This court has witnessed the dismal waste of time and effort, both on the part
of the parties and the court, in cases where an early disclosure of limited policy
limits would have led to prompt settlements that were not reached until the
eve of trial, when such information was first revealed after needless pretrial
discovery and preparation for trial. Aside from such unnecessary consump-
tion of time and effort resulting from inability to learn such crucial informa-
tion until the very last minute, the effect frequently is to disrupt the court's
schedule and cause loss of trial time for many needy prospective litigants.
Id. at 248.
39 E.g., Flynn v. Williams, 30 F.R.D. 66, 67 (D. Conn. 1958); McClure v. Boeger,
105 F. Supp. 612, 613 (E.D. Pa. 1952).
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